David Hume (1711–76) is one of a small number of philosophers who explicitly discuss beliefs acquired via testimony. His account can be found in the discussion of miracles in his first Enquiry.He is taken to have a reductionist account in which we are justified in accepting testimonial reports if there is good empirical evidence that the speaker is reliable. In the contemporary debate concerning the epistemology of testimony this Humean position is contrasted with non-reductionist accounts where the default position is one of trust. Hume’s Enquiry discussion will be examined, along with its relation to his thoughts about testimony in other works such as the Treatise of Human Nature and The History of England. In various places Hume claims that beliefs can be acquired from others via sympathy. This, for Hume, is a technical term describing the mechanistic way that mental states such as emotions and beliefs propagate between people. We shall investigate the role that sympathy could play with respect to the epistemology of testimony and also its wider role in Hume’s views on morality, aesthetics, religion and politics. The course consists of three lectures, each comprising 60 minutes of presentation and 30 minutes of discussion.

Baier, A. & Waldow, A. 2008. ‘A Conversation between Annette Baier and Anik Waldow about Hume’s Account of Sympathy’, Hume Studies 34(1), 61–87.

Bailey, A. & O’Brien, D. 2007. Reader’s Guide to Hume’s Enquiry concerning Understanding, Continuum, London.

Brown, C. 2008. ‘Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy’ in A Companion to Hume, ed. E. Radcliffe, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.

Gelfert, A. 2010. ‘Hume on Testimony Revisited’, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13, 60–75.

Hume, D. 1772. ‘Of Miracles’ in Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. T. Beauchamp, Oxford University Press, Oxford [2000].

Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

2-3 ETCS with additional literature